This paper examines the effect of trade policy space on production diversification, and particularly on industrialization. We define trade policy space as the extent of constraints imposed by non-trade obligations, and possibly bilateral and regional trade agreements on the current trade policy stance. Thus, the lower the extent of these constraints, the higher is the available trade policy space to promote production diversification and particularly on industrialization. The empirical analysis uses a sample of 159 countries, over the period 1995-2015, and shows that trade policy space is conducive to production diversification and industrialization, although the effect could vary across sub-samples.
Introduction
The debate on whether countries should diversify their product baskets or increase their specialization in a narrow range of products (including for export) remains unsettled. 1 However, there seems to be a convergence of views that developing countries, in particular those that rely on primary commodities (or natural-resource based products)this is notably the case for poor countriesshould diversify their production away from the primary commodities sector towards sectors with higher value addition and productivity, such as the manufacturing sector. At the same time, a renewed attention by policymakers and international institutions has been focusing on the issue of structural change, including structural change in production, towards higher value-added sectors such as the manufacturing and services sectors (see for example, Kaulich, 2012) . However, in the literature, very few studies have been devoted to the issue of production diversification. 2 In fact, structural change could not be de-linked from production diversification. According to De Benedictis and Tamberi (2004) , diversification and structural change are two different phenomena at work, which should be treated separately. In this author's view, structural change means, in general terms, diversifying away from specialization in the agricultural sector by entering industrial activities and eventually specializing in services. This movement emerges as a U-curve, as it entails a stage of (production) diversification characterized by more or less equal shares of the three sectors, namely primary products sector, manufacturing sector and services sector. In view of the importance of diversifying production across various sectors of the economy, and particularly towards the manufacturing sector (given the latter's huge positive impact in terms jobs creation, spillovers to other sectors; and positive impacts on macroeconomic indicators), policymakers want to secure a greater policy spacetrade policy spaceto promote structural change, or at least production diversification across various sectors in the economy, and industrialization. 3 The current paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on the production diversification issue at the aggregate (macroeconomic) level.
The policy space that could help countries, including developing countries promote the diversification of production, and notably industrialization and achieve their development objectives, has been the subject of an intense debate in the international trade and development literature. More generally, the concept of policy space has been defined in various ways in the literature. For example, UNCTAD (2014) has considered policy space as the freedom and ability of a government to identify and pursue the most appropriate mix of economic and social policies to achieve equitable and sustainable development that is best suited to its particular national context. Mayer (2009) has defined policy space as the combination of de jure policy sovereignty and de facto national policy autonomy, where De jure policy sovereignty refers to the formal authority of national policymakers over policy goals and instruments, and de facto national policy control involves the ability of national policymakers to set priorities, influence specific targets, and weigh possible tradeoffs. For the first time in the São Paulo Consensus of 2004 (see UNCTAD, 2004) , a concept of policy space confined to trade and investment has been defined. Policy space (relating to trade and investment) has been considered as 'the scope for domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development' which might be 'framed by international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations'. More recently, van der Ven (2017, p. 39) has used the concept of 'WTO trade policy', which is defined as the 'unrestricted space that non-LDCs (Least developed countries) have under the WTO to implement strategic interventions concerning trade, investment and industrial policy. She has indicated that this definition of trade policy space is more closed to 'a de Jure approach' trade policy space, which identifies the theoretical policy space, in contrast with the 'de facto space approach', which focuses on the extent to which WTO Members can engage in certain conductirrespective of its WTO consistencywithout experiencing repercussions under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO.
Since the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the debate has specifically focused on whether countries' trade policy space has been constrained by multilateral trade agreements. Policy space related to trade could involve the flexibilities embodied in multilateral rules contained in WTO Agreements and Decisions in favor of developing countriesthe so-called 'Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) to developing countries'. These entail for example, 4 tariffs water (i.e., the difference between the applied tariffs and the bound tariff that a country commits at the WTO not to exceed); flexibilities on performance requirements measures on trade and investment; flexibilities concerning quantitative restrictions contained in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as well as flexibilities contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on Trade and Investment Measures (TRIMS), and in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).
There have been two major views on whether multilateral trade agreements have constrained or not WTO Members' trade policy space. On the one hand, some authors (e.g., Chang, 2002; Wade, 2003; DiCaprio and Gallagher, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006; Mayer, 2009; Santos, 2012; Rowden, 2015) have held the view that the WTO reflects the economic interests of rich countries, and undermines the ability of developing countries to create and upgrade their industries, to promote technological development and to strengthen their domestic markets. Other authors (e.g., Aggarwal and Evenett, 2014; Chang, 2015) have argued that there is a tendency to exaggerate the constraints imposed by WTO rules on the policy space of countries, notably developing countries. Santos (2012) has argued that many of the mechanisms of protection that existed under the GATT rules could be used in a different legal form under WTO rules. In the same vein, UNCTAD (2014, Chap. V) has underlined that even though the Uruguay Round Agreements (URAs) (that have led to the creation of the WTO) have reduced the policy space available to WTO Members, some flexibilities have remained intact for these Members. Additionally, regional trade agreements 5 (RTAs) have considerably reduced the policy space that was preserved under the multilateral trade regime. UNECA (2015, Chap. 5, p. 157) has stressed that the main concern for Africa in terms of policy space relates to regional trade agreements, which may further limit policy options for industrialization. As many African countries are least developed countries (LDCs) (that have many favorable treatments in the WTO rules), the UNECA's report has concluded that the loss of policy space for African economies has so far been relatively insignificant. van der Ven (2017, p. 75) has argued that the complexity of WTO rules and their economic effect may lead a country, in good faith, to adopt WTO-inconsistent policies. Based on case studies of industrial policy priorities and key trade and investment laws and regulation in three non-LDCs African countries (Ghana, Kenya and Namibia), she has concluded that Africa's industrialization is not genuinely constrained by the shrinking of the WTO policy space. In this author's view, a key impediment to the implementation of industrial policy objectives in Africa was the lack of policy alignment and understanding of the WTO policy space. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI, 2007) has put forth the argument that there still exist some gains that flow precisely from the limitation of trade policy space that arises from the constraints imposed by international rules, including international trade obligations. This is because international regulations provide an international commitment ('lock in'), which is more stable than domestic regulation.
The current article draws on this trade policy space debate to examine empirically the extent to which trade policy space influences countries' production diversification and particularly industrialization. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that quantifies trade policy space and examines one of its macroeconomic implications, namely its impact on production diversification and particularly industrialization. To perform the analysis, we use a definition of trade policy space that is slightly different from the ones presented above. Specifically, we define trade policy space in relation to the structural factors that could contribute to shaping the current trade policy stance. The idea here is that countries do not devise their trade policy stanceto address short-term and long-term challengesin a vacuum. Rather, a number of structural factors, including both structural domestic and international factors (implicitly or explicitly) influence the design of trade policy, and therefore contribute to determine the extent of available trade policy space. In this context, we consider trade policy space as the room of maneuvre available to a government once its current trade policy is depurated from the impact of these structural domestic and international factors that 5 According to UNCTAD (2014, Chap. V), North-South Agreements contain a larger number of both WTO-plus and WTO-extra provisions than either North-North or South-South Agreements. These provisions cover competition policy, investment and capital movement, government procurement, labor mobility and environmental standards. UNECA (2016) has also provided concrete examples on how RTAs such as Economic Partnership Agreements could restrict more policy space than WTO rules. contribute to shaping it. In other words, trade policy space reflects the space for trade policy design, which is available to a country, once the structural (measurable) domestic and international policies and factors that can constrain it are taken into account. This definition of trade policy space reflects much more a 'De jure trade policy space' rather than a 'De facto trade policy space'. Such a De Jure trade policy space could be exploited by governments to address short term as long as long-term challenges. Specifically, it could be used in various ways to promote production diversification, including industrialization as long as trade measures adopted by governments are coherent and consistent with the countries' international commitments (notably visà-vis WTO's commitments), and regional and bilateral commitments. For example, depending on the space that a country enjoys, it could combine different measures, including subsidies for export promotion, measures on local content requirements, export performance requirements measures, and measures relating to intellectual property rights to inter alia, promote innovation, ensuring transfer of technology, and ultimately promote production diversification and industrialization. In light of the foregoing, we expect trade policy space to generate higher production diversification, and particularly promote industrialization. In the rest of the analysis, we test empirically how trade policy space influences countries' production diversification across the three major sectors of the economy, namely the agriculture, the manufactured and the services sector. We deepen the analysis by also investigating the effect of trade policy space on industrialization.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the measure of trade policy space, as defined above. Section 3 discusses the measure of production diversification, and presents the model specification to assess empirically the effect of trade policy space on production diversification. Section 4 interprets the results of the estimation of the model presented in Sec. 3. Section 5 deepens the analysis by investigating the effect of trade policy space on industrialization. Section 6 concludes.
Measure of Trade Policy Space
To recall, 'De Jure trade policy space' is defined as the space, i.e., the room of maneuvre available to a government to devise its trade policy, once domestic and international structural factors that could influence this trade policy are taken into account. Drawing from the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of trade policy (e.g., Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2002; Ancharaz, 2003; Rose, 2013) and in particular from Gnangnon (2017a) , we consider the following structural domestic factors that contribute to shaping countries' trade policy stance. These include the level of financial openness (capital account openness); the depth of financial development; the (economic) development level; the size of population; and the institutional and governance quality. International structural factors that influence the current trade policy stance include the level of multilateral trade liberalization and terms of trade. Once these factors are taken into account, the indicator of trade policy space would reflect the influence of other factors (much more difficult to measure), such as the extent of constraints imposed by countries' non-trade international (as well as regional and bilateral) obligations that could influence the current trade policy, the development aid related constraints imposed by development aid providers, 6 and to some extent the constraints imposed by bilateral and regional agreements. Thus, the higher these constraints, the lower is the level of available trade policy space.
In light of the foregoing, we postulate the following model:
where i represents a country's index; t denotes the time-period. To estimate model (1), we use an unbalanced panel dataset comprising 165 countries (developed and developing countries) over the period of 1995 to 2015, based on data availability. α 0 to α 8 are parameters to be estimated. μ i are countries' fixed effects; ω it is a well-behaving error term. "DTP" is the index of domestic trade policy, while "MTP" is the index of multilateral trade policy. We follow a number of studies (e.g., Ratnaike, 2012; Gnangnon, 2017a Gnangnon, , 2017b Gnangnon, , 2017c Gnangnon, , 2017d Gnangnon, , 2017e, 2017f, 2018a Gnangnon, , 2018b and compute the MTP indicator by relying on the 'freedom to trade internationally' indicator proposed by the Heritage Foundation (see Miller et al., 2017) as the measure of domestic trade policy (see details on this indicator in Appendix A). This trade freedom indicator is graded on a scale of 0 to 100, with a rise indicating lower trade barriers, i.e., higher trade liberalization, while a decrease reflects rising trade protectionism. Thus, for a given country, multilateral trade policy is calculated as the average trade freedom score of the rest of the world, i.e., for all the other countries (except for the concerned country) for which data exist. This indicator of 'multilateral trade policy' is therefore a proxy of the level of international trade barriers faced by a given country in acceding to other countries' markets, i.e., the international trade market.
In model (1), the right-hand side variables include the level of financial openness (capital account openness) ("FINPOL"), the depth of financial development ("FIN-DEV"), the economic development level ("GDPC"), the size of population "POP", and the institutional and governance quality ("INST"), which represent the domestic structural factors. The level of multilateral trade policy ("MTP") and terms of trade ("TERMS"), which act as international structural factors that would influence domestic trade policy. The institutional and governance quality has been measured using the factor analysis, notably the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (e.g., Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Shapiro, 2002; Buchanan et al., 2012 ) (see Appendix A). To do so, we rely on six institutional and governance indicators, including a measure of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; an index of voice and accountability; a regulatory quality index; a rule of law index; a government effectiveness index; and an index of corruption. Higher values of the "INST" indicator represent better governance and institutional quality.
In terms of theoretical impact of these control variables, we expect a positive impact of multilateral trade liberalization on domestic trade policy liberalization (Gnangnon, 2017a) . We also expect that a rise in real per capita income would be associated with higher domestic trade policy liberalization (see Rodrik, 1995; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2002) . In the meantime, higher depth of financial development is expected to influence positively domestic trade policy liberalization (Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2002) . Terms of trade improvement could exert a positive or negative impact on domestic trade policy liberalization (see Gnangnon, 2017a) . Incidentally, we expect higher financial openness to affect positively domestic trade policy liberalization because of the close positive link between financial openness and trade liberalization (or trade openness) (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; Vo and Daly, 2007) .
Appendix A presents the description of all variables contained in model (1), and Appendix B shows the list of countries used for the estimation of this model. Appendix C reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in the model.
From model (1), the indicator of trade policy space (also referred to as 'De Jure Trade Policy Space') is computed as the gap (or space) between the current level of trade policy and the predicted level of trade policy, given the structural domestic and international factors highlighted above. Hence, the De Jure Trade Policy Space denoted "TPSPACE" is given by TPSPACE ¼ DTP= g DTP, where DTP represents the current level of trade policy and g DTP is the predicted values of DTP based on the estimation of equation (1). A rise in the values of this indicator reflects greater trade policy space, and lower values of this index reflect the shrinking of trade policy space.
To calculate the indicator "TPSPACE", we estimate model (1) by means of the twostep system Generalized Methods of Moments (hereinafter, SGMM) approach proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for dynamic panels with a small large cross-section and time dimension. The SGMM involves the combination of an equation in differences with an equation in levels where lagged first differences are used as instruments for the levels equation and lagged levels are used as instruments for the first-difference equation. This estimator helps deal with several endogeneity concerns that could arise from model (1). These endogeneity issues are related to the presence of the one-year lag of the dependent variable as a regressor (which is correlated with the unobserved country-specific effects), as well as the eventual reverse causality from the dependent variable to a number of regressors, including "FINPOL", "FINDEV", and "GDPC". Therefore, in the estimation of model (1), we consider these three variables as endogenous. The variable "INST" has been considered as exogenous for two reasons: first, it changes little over time; second, the use of the factor analysis severely mitigates the endogeneity concern that could arise from the reverse causality from the dependent variable to the "INST" variable (see a similar argument in Portugal-Perez and Wilson, 2012). The other variables have been considered as exogenous. The results of the estimation are provided in Table 1 .
To check the validity of the SGMM estimator, we report at the bottom of this table the results of several diagnostic tests. These include the Arellano-Bond test of first-order serial correlation in the error term (denoted AR(1)) and no second-order autocorrelation in the error term (denoted AR(2)). We also present the results of no third-order autocorrelation in the error term (denoted AR(3)). The last diagnostic test is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which determines the validity of the instruments used in the estimations. Results in Table 1 indicate that the coefficient associated with the one-year lag of the variable "DTP" is positive and statistically Notes: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-step system GMM estimations, the variables "FINPOL", "FINDEV" and "Log(GDPC)" have been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the level of domestic trade policy in year t À 1 is positively related to the current year's level of domestic trade policy. This finding suggests that the variable "DTP" exhibits a state dependence path. The outcomes of the diagnostic tests that help assess the validity of the SGMM are reported at the bottom of Table 1 . We observe that the p-values associated with the AR(1) are 0, whereas the p-values relating to AR(2) and AR(3) are higher than 0.10. Moreover, the p-values associated with the Sargan test are higher than 0.10. Incidentally, the number of instruments is lower than the number of countries. Against this background, we conclude that the SGMM estimator is well appropriate for carrying out the estimations of model (1). Turning now to the estimates displayed in Table 1 , we find that domestic trade policy liberalization is positively driven by greater multilateral trade liberalization, higher financial openness, higher depth of financial development, higher development level (i.e., higher real per capita income), and the rise in the size of the population. Terms of trade influence negatively and significantly (but only at the 10% level) domestic trade policy liberalization. Finally, institutional and governance quality does not influence domestic trade policy. On the basis of these outcomes, we compute the index of trade policy space. To provide an insight into how TPSPACE has evolved over the period of study, we present in Fig. 1 the evolution of the average of TPSPACE over the period considered in the analysis, in particular using non-overlapping sub-periods of 3-year average data (these sub-periods include 1995-1997; 1998-2000; 2001-2003; 2004-2004; 2007-2009; 2010-2012; and 2013-2015) . We have presented the graph using non-overlapping subperiods of 3-year average in order to reduce the impact of business cycles on the TPSPACE variable. This is also because in the empirical analysis of the impact of trade policy space on production diversification, we use the same panel dataset, including with these non-overlapping sub-periods. Figure 1 has been constructed using subsamples, defined on the basis of the World Bank classification of countries in the world. These sub-samples include the low-income countries ("LICs"), the lowermiddle income countries ("LMICs"), the upper-middle income countries ("UMICs"), and the high-income countries ("HICs"). The list of countries contained in these subsamples is presented in Appendix D. Figure 1 suggests that from 1995-1997 to 2001-2003 , HICs appear to be the category of countries that has experienced the highest level of trade policy space, followed by UMICs, LMICs, and LICs (that have experienced the lowest level of trade policy space). However, from 1995-1997 to 2004-2006 , the trade policy space of LICs has progressively increased to reach its highest level in [2004] [2005] [2006] . For LMICs, trade policy space has first increased from 1995-1997 to 1998-2000, and then declined from 1998-2000 to 2004-2006 . It has then increased from 2004-2006 to 2013-2015. HICs' trade policy space has steadily declined from 1995-1997 to 2013-2015. For LMICs, trade policy space has fluctuated over the period, but has specifically declined from 2007-2009 to 2013-2015. Overall, while the levels of trade policy space were different across the sub-samples at the beginning of the period (1995) (1996) (1997) , at the end of the period (2013) (2014) (2015) , all sub-samples have almost the same level of trade policy space.
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Trade Policy Space on Production Diversification
Before laying down the model specification that helps examine empirically how trade policy space influences production diversification, we first need to present the measure of production diversification.
Measure of production diversification
We measure (at the aggregate level) the concentration (or diversification) of production by using the Herfindhal index, which is well employed in the empirical literature. We define the index of production concentration as follows:
where j denotes the sector for which the production's share (S j ) is calculated. N is the number of sectors over which the index is being calculated. Overall, four sectors are considered in the analysis, although the index has been calculated over a set of three, and four sectors separately (see below). The four sectors include the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors for products (goods), and the services sector.
Prod j represents the share (in percentage) of value added in production of one of the four sectors highlighted above; N represents the number of production sectors (among the four sectors considered in the analysis). Therefore, we calculate two indices of production diversification: index of goods production diversificationdenoted "PRODDIV1" -(which reflects production diversification across the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors), and index of goods and services production diversificationdenoted "PRODDIV2" -(which reflects production diversification across the agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services sectors).
These indices (based on the use of formulae (2) and (3)) are calculated for each country contained in the sample and per year, i.e., over the entire panel dataset comprising 159 countries, 7 which includes both developed and developing countries, over the period 1995-2015. Higher values of the indices PRODDIV1 and PRODDIV2 for a given country reflect higher level of production diversification, while lower values of these indices indicate a rise in the level of production concentration (i.e., lower level of production diversification).
A number of limits relating to the computation of these two indices are worth mentioning here. First, as the indices have been calculated using aggregate sectoral production shares across the three or four sectors rather than across detailed sub-sectors, they may not perfectly reflect the full extent of diversification of production across these sectors. At the same time, it would be difficult to obtain data on services at a high disaggregated level. Additionally, while disaggregated data on exports of goods (including within goods sectors) exist for many countries, this is not the case for production of goods for many countries. All these justify why we rely on a simple measure of production diversification, using aggregated sectoral production shares. These indices of production diversification are constructed in the same spirit as the construction of indices of structural change in production, which provide the extent of structural change, using aggregate sectoral production shares data (see for example Fiorini et al., 2013; Productivity Commission, 1998; Bacchetta and Jansen, 2003; Cortuk and Singh, 2011) .
Descriptive statistics on the calculated two indices are provided in Appendix E. Values of PRODDIV1 range between 1.08 and 3, with the average value amounting to 2.19 and the standard deviation being 0.45. Similarly, values of PRODDIV2 range between 1.17 and 3.88, with an average of 2.84, and a standard deviation of 0.51. Values of trade policy space across countries range between 0.39 and 1.56, with an average value amounting to 0.996, and a standard deviation given by 0.116 (see Appendix E).
To provide an insight into the relationship between trade policy space and production diversification, we present in Fig. 2 the cross plot between "TPSPACE" and "PRODDIV1" indices over the full sample as well as all over sub-samples highlighted above. We also display in Fig. 3 the correlation pattern between "TPSPACE" and "PRODDIV2" indices, over the full sample as well as all over sub-samples. Figure 2 shows that while for the full sample, the correlation pattern between TPSPACE and PRODDIV1 is loosely positive, it is clearly negative for LMICs and strongly positive for UMICs and HICs. However, for LICs, this correlation pattern is not clear. In Fig. 3 , the correlation pattern between "TPSPACE" and "PRODDIV2" is not clear for the full sample and the sub-sample of LICs, whereas it is negative for LMICs, and strongly positive for UMICs and HICs.
Model specification on the impact of trade policy space on production diversification
To investigate the impact of trade policy space on production diversification, we draw on many aspects from the related literature, (2017) and Martins (2017) . 8 The literature on the macroeconomic determinants of production diversification is very scant. In light of the closed link (highlighted in Sec. 1) between structural change and production diversification, we draw control variables from the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of structural change. 9 It is worth noting that the study of Dabla-Norris et al. (2013) has yet examined countries' fundamentals, as well as their policy and institutional factors that explain the differences in output structures. Based on these studies, we consider a number of variablesin addition to the key variable of interest, namely trade policy space, that have the potential to influence the effect of trade policy space on production diversification. These variables include the degree of multilateral trade liberalization, denoted "MTP"; the level of educational attainment (denoted "EDU"); the depth of financial development (denoted "FINDEV"); financial openness (denoted "FINPOL"); countries' physical fundamentals, such as the arable land available to countries (denoted "ARABLE"), and countries' other characteristics such as the real per capita income (denoted "GDPC", which captures both the domestic demand pattern, but also the economic development level of a given country), their population size (denoted "POP"), and their institutional and governance quality (denoted "INST"). Incidentally, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) have analyzed the stages of diversification, and shown the existence of a nonlinear relationship between countries' level of development and their degree of production (and exports) diversification. In particular, these authors have shown that countries first diversify and then specialize in their production (and exports) over their stages of development. In light of this, we also include in the model specification the square term of real per capita income variable in addition to the real per capita income. Against this background, we postulate the following model (4):
where i represents a country's index; t denotes the time-period. We use the same panel dataset as for model (1), but the number of countries is restricted here to 159 because data is not available for the six other countries. The dependent variable "PRODDIV" stands for the indicator of production diversification. It could be either "PRODDIV1" or "PRODDIV2". "TPSPACE" is the key variable of interest. ' 0 to ' 11 are parameters to b1 estimated. # i are countries' fixed effects; ω t captures the time effects, which represent the global shocks that could affect all countries' production diversification path together. " it is a well-behaving error term.
It is worth noting that in model (4), we have applied the natural logarithm to the variables "GDPC" and its square term, as well as the to the variable "ARABLE" in order to limit the skewness of these variables. Appendix A describes the variables used in model (4); The list of countries used in the estimation of model (4) is presented in Appendix B. Appendix E displays the descriptive statistics on the variables of model (4).
Discussion on the expected theoretical effects of control variables on production diversification
Following Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) , we expect real per capita income to exert a nonlinear impact (in terms of an inverted U-curve) on the degree of production diversification. At the same time, we expect higher education level attainment to exert a positive impact on production diversification. For example, Aghion and Howitt (1998) have argued that human capital characteristics, among other factors, can affect general conditions for product diversification. However, if the bulk of human capital accumulated is mainly used in existing activities, educational attainment would exert a negative effect on production diversification, i.e., it would enhance production concentration (for example, see Agosin et al., 2012 for a similar argument in the case of export diversification). Concerning financial development, Levine (2005) has argued that higher financial development could allow greater diversification, risk sharing, and investment in higher productivity activities, and hence facilitate resource allocation across the economy. Similarly, higher financial development can finance the production of more differentiated products, and hence promote production diversification. In this scenario, financial development would induce higher production diversification. Meanwhile, the financial sector could decide to finance existing activities, including those in which the economy has already a competitive advantage (see also Agosin et al. (2012) for a similar argument). In this context, higher financial development would be associated with production concentration. We expect multilateral trade policy liberalization to enhance production diversification by contributing to reducing production costs (notably through lower costs of imported inputs used in the production process), as well as through higher FDI inflows (see Gnangnon, 2017b) , which would inter alia facilitate the transfer of technology in the economy. In the meantime, if multilateral trade liberalization leads countries to further specialize on the set of products and/or services in which they have a comparative advantage, then it would enhance production concentration rather than promoting production diversification.
The effect of financial openness on manufacturing production would primarily take place through its effect positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, which could in turn generate higher share of manufacturing production in total output. For example, multinationals undertaking FDI could introduce new technologies in the host-country, and therefore make technology more accessible to domestically-owned firms (Baldwin et al., 1999) . Such a technology can promote industrialization and eventually production diversification, by generating spillovers to the domestic economy of the host-country through several channels, including imitation channel, the labor turnover or the acquisition of human capital channel. 10 Higher technological development could also enhance industrialization and production diversification through the vertical linkages channel, whereby spillovers could occur from a multinational firm to its domestic suppliers or customers, via for example, the set-up of production facilities, the provision of managerial know-how and training (see Lall, 1980) . According to Moran (2010) , through the vertical linkages channel, multinational enterprises could introduce a breakthrough in the transformation of local economies by bringing new ideas and best practices that would help explore new production activities, and hence promote industrialization. However, it is still possible that multinational firms concentrate in the host country, on the existing activities, with a view to further developing them, without necessarily diversifying these activities. In this context, FDI inflows might not induce higher production diversification and eventually manufacturing production. For example, Gui-Diby and Renard (2015) have examined whether inward FDI influences the industrialization process in Africa, and obtained evidence of no significant impact of FDI on the industrialization of these countries. In these authors' view, this situation is explained by the fact that FDI inflows into these countries usually invest in the natural resource sector (i.e., resource-seeking FDI inflows are prevalent in African economies). Additionally, there exists weak or no links between multinationals and local enterprises in these economies.
The size of the population has been introduced in the model to control for possible scale effects that can affect manufacturing production. Concerning multilateral trade liberalization, we expect greater multilateral trade liberalization to induce lower input costs, which could provide incentives to industrialize. Additionally, multilateral trade liberalization could promote FDI inflows (e.g., Collie, 2011; Gnangnon, 2017b) , which might lead to greater production diversification and higher manufacturing production. Incidentally, we expect higher education level to be conducive to higher production diversification, as well as manufacturing production share.
Let us now turn to the expected theoretical impact of institutional quality on production diversification and industrialization. According to North (1980) , institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions. This therefore suggests that institutions help shape the incentive structure in the society that may increase or hamper the economic activities. Institutions could therefore affect output, output structure, including diversification of production. They could also do so by helping to reduce uncertainties that arise from incomplete information concerning the behavior of other individuals in the process of interaction. We hypothesize that while institutions alone could not produce output, they could affect the latter, including output structure (and output diversification) through their effect on the accumulation of human and physical capital, as well as improvement in business environment. Additionally, by setting the rules of interaction between private actors as well as between the public sector and private actors, good institutional and governance quality would reduce the level of uncertainty inherent to these interactions. Hall and Jones (1999) have shown that huge variations in capital accumulation, education attainment, and productivity growth could explain differences in the institutions across the globe. Specifically, they have demonstrated that just under half of the impact of institutions on output is through their effect on factor accumulation, while the remainder is due to the impact of institutions on productivity. Along the same lines, Bernard and Jones (1996) have underlined the role of institutions in promoting the adoption of new technologies. In particular, they have emphasized that good quality institutions enhance the ability of a country to adopt new technologies invented elsewhere which may play an important role in upgrading the development process of a country. In turn, this could contribute to promoting production diversification. Similarly, Iqbal and Daly (2014) have indicated that weak institutions divert resources from productive sector to unproductive sector hence promote rent seeking activities. Faruq (2011) has argued that widespread corruption, inefficient bureaucracy, and a high risk of expropriation of private property by the government can create uncertainty among producers and discourage them from investing and innovating over the long term. These could in turn hurt the process of production diversification across the different sectors in the economy. Overall, we expect that good institutional and governance quality would help promote production diversification not only by helping accumulate human and physical capital, and diverting these factors towards productive activities, but also by contributing to improving business environment. We compute the synthetic measure of governance and institutional quality in the same way as in Sec. 2, i.e., by using the factor analysis (notably the Principal Component Analysis -PCA) and the six indicators of institutions and governance highlighted in Sec. 2. It is worth recalling that higher values of the "INST" indicator represent better institutional and governance quality.
As for model (1), we estimate model (4) using the SGMM approach, where the variables of interest, i.e., TPSPACE has been considered as endogenous. This endogeneity does not only stem from the reverse causality from the dependent variable to TPSPACE, but also from the possible measurement error associated with the calculation of TPSPACE. Variables "FINDEV", "EDU", and "FINPOL" have been also considered as endogenous in the analysis due to reverse causality problem. Incidentally, we consider that endogeneity of the variable "INST" is severely mitigated because values of this variable change little over time, and also because we have used the factor analysis to compute it (see similar arguments in Sec. 2 for model (1)).
For the empirical analysis on the effect of trade policy space on production diversification, based on the SGMM estimator, we proceed as follows:
-First, we estimate model (4) respectively with "PRODDIV1" and "PRODDIV2" as the dependent variable. The results of these estimations are reported in Table 2 . -Second, we estimate several variants of model (4) where the dependent variable is "PRODDIV1", with a view to investigating the net effect of trade policy space on production diversification for each of the sub-samples LICs, LMICs, UMICs, and Notes: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-step system GMM estimations, the variables "TPSPACE", "FINDEV", "EDU", "FINPOL" and the interaction terms have been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. Table 3 . Differentiated impact of trade policy space on production diversification ("PRODDIV1"). HICs. These estimations amount to creating a dummy variable for each of these sub-samples and introducing once each dummy (along with its interaction with TPSPACE variable) in model (4). It is worth noting that we do not perform the regressions over each sub-sample simply because the SGMM approach is valid (generate consistent estimates) over large N and small T. The results of these different estimations are reported in Table 3 . Notes: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
In the two-step system GMM estimations, the variables "TPSPACE", "FINDEV", "EDU", "FINPOL" and the interaction terms have been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. -Third, we apply the same procedure as above to calculate the net effect of trade policy space on production diversification ("PRODDIV2") for each of the subsamples LICs, LMICs, UMICs, and HICs. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4 .
Analysis of Empirical Results on the Effect of Trade Policy Space on Production Diversification
Results across columns of Tables 2-4 suggest that there exist a state dependence path in the indices of production diversification (PRODDIV1 and PRODDIV2). This is because the coefficient associated with the one-period lag of these indices is always positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (thereby indicating that the level of production diversification in the period t À 1 is positively related to the production diversification level in the period t). The outcomes of the diagnostic tests that help evaluate the appropriateness of the SGMM estimator are reported at the bottom of all columns of Tables 2-4. We observe across all these columns that the p-values associated with the AR(1) are 0, whereas the p-values relating to AR(2) and AR(3) are higher than 0.10. Moreover, the p-values associated with the Sargan test are higher than 0.10. In addition, the number of instruments is consistently lower than the number of countries. Summing up, the combination of these results suggests that the SGMM estimator is appropriate for the different estimations of model (4).
Let us now consider the estimates displayed in Table 1 . We obtain from columns [1] and [2] that over the full sample, trade policy space exerts a positive and significant impact on production diversification (be it across the goods sectors or across the goods and services sectors). This is because the coefficient of the TPSPACE variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in each of these two columns. A 1point increase in the index of TPSPACE is associated with 2 points increase in the index of production diversification across goods sectors, and 2.8-points increase in the Notes: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
In the two-step system GMM estimations, the variables "TPSPACE", "FINDEV", "EDU", "FINPOL" and the interaction terms have been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions.
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index of production diversification across the sectors of goods and services. Results concerning control variables in column [1] show that positive drivers of production diversification across goods sectors include greater multilateral trade liberalization, higher financial openness, higher education level, lower financial development and lower population size. The negative effect of financial development on production diversification across the goods sectors may yet be explained by different effects across countries in the full sample, but also by the possible existence of a nonlinear effect of financial development on production diversification. However, as this is not the main objective of this study, we do not go deeper in such analysis. Real per capita income is nonlinearly associated with production diversification across the goods sectors: at the initial stages of their development, countries tend to experience a higher production concentration across goods sectors; however, as the development level rises, countries tend to diversify their production of goods across goods sectors. Institutional and governance quality and the share of arable land in total land area do not appear to influence significantly (at the 1% level) production diversification across goods sectors.
Results concerning control variables in column [2] of Table 2 indicate that greater multilateral trade liberalization, higher financial openness, higher education level, and lower population size influence positively and significantly production diversification across the goods and services sectors. While there is no significant effect of real per capita income and its square term on production diversification across the goods and services sectors, we obtain that the latter is positively affected by the share of arable land in total land area, and negatively influenced by the institutional and governance quality (this means that better institutional and governance quality tends to induce a higher production concentration across the goods and services sectors).
Turning to the estimates displayed in Table 3 , we observe that results related to control variables (with the exception of the real per capita income and its square term, which are not significantly related to production diversification across the goods sectors) are consistent with results provided in column [1] of Table 2 . With respect to our variable of interest TPSPACE, we obtain that at the 5% level of statistical significance, the net effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods sectors in LICs, LMICs, UMICs, and HICs is given respectively by the coefficients 2.96; 0.787 (¼ 1:790 À 1:003); 2.041; and 4.47 (¼ 2:365 þ 2:101). These mean that whatever the group of countries considered, trade policy space always exerts a positive and significant effect on production diversification across the goods sectors. The group of HICs appears to be the one that enjoys the highest positive effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods sector. It is followed by LICs, UMICs, and LMICs. A 1-point increase in the value of TPSPACE induces a 2.96-point rise in the index of production diversification across the goods sectors in LICs, a 0.79-point rise in the index of production diversification across the goods sectors in LMICs, a 2.04-point increase in the index of production diversification across the goods sectors in UMICs, and a 4.47-point rise in the index of production diversification across the goods sectors in HICs.
Taking up results in Table 4 , we observe that the estimates associated with control variables are broadly in line with those reported in column [2] of Table 2 . As for our variable of interest, we obtain that at the 5% level of statistical significance, the net effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods and services sectors in LICs, LMICs, UMICs, and HICs is given, respectively, by the coefficients 2.17; À0.076 (¼ 2:032 À 2:108); 3.15 (¼ 1:207 þ 1:939); 4.5 (¼ 2:789 þ 1:746). These results show that trade policy space influences positively and significantly production diversification across the goods and services sectors in LICs, UMICs, and HICs, whereas it is associated with production concentration in some goods and/or services sectors in LMICs. A 1-point rise in the index of trade policy space is associated with a 2.17-point increase in PRODDIV2 in LICs, a 0.076-point decline in PRODDIV2 in LMICs, a 3.15-point increase in PRODDIV2 in UMICs, and a 4.5point rise in PRODDIV2 in HICs. Once again, the category of HICs appears once again to be the group of countries that enjoys the highest positive effect of trade policy space on production diversification across goods and services sectors. It is followed by UMICs and then LICs. The negative effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods and services sectors in LMICs surely hides differentiated effects across countries within this group, i.e., some countries in this category may enjoy a positive effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods and services sectors, while others may experience a negative effect and even a statistically nil effect.
Further Analysis: Impact of Trade Policy Space on Industrialization
In Sec. 3.1, we have highlighted some limits related to the measures of production diversification used in the analysis. To further illustrate some of these limits, let us consider the goods sectors (agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors), and assume that a country A produces three products whose value added are evenly distributed across the three goods sectors considered in the analysis. We can definitely consider that this country has experienced a production diversification across the three goods sectors. However, for a country B that produces five products concentrated only in the manufactured sector, we will be temptedbased on the "PRODDIV1" indexto conclude that country B has experienced a higher product concentration, although country B has even produced a wider range of products than country A. Thus, higher values of our production diversification indices may not necessarily reflect the full extent of production diversification across the production sectors. For this reason, we find useful and important to complement previous analyses on the effect of trade policy space on production diversification with an empirical investigation of the effect of trade policy space on industrialization. This section therefore completes the empirical analysis carried out in Secs. 3 and 4 by examining the effect of trade policy space on industrialization. We measure industrialization 11 by the share of manufacturing production in total output (see for example Chandra, 1992; Dodzin and Vamvakidis, 2004; Kang and Lee, 2011; Gui-Diby and Renard, 2015) .
Before laying down the model specification that would help examine empirically how trade policy space influences the share of manufacturing production in total output (henceforth referred to as manufacturing production share), we provide in Fig. 4 a cross-plot between trade policy space and the share of manufacturing production in total output, over the full sample, as well as over the sub-samples LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs. It could be observed from this graph that trade policy space is positively correlated with value added in manufacturing production over the full sample, as well as for sub-samples LMICs, UMICs and HICs. However, for LICs, the 11 It is worth noting that other studies (e.g., Kaya, 2010; Kang and Lee, 2011; Gui-Diby and Renard, 2015) have measured industrialization by the share of employment in the manufacturing sector. Echaudemaison (2003) has measured industrialization by the share of the secondary sector in terms of employment and GDP, and UNIDO (2013) has considered De-industrialization as the "long-term decline in manufacturing relative to other sectors". However, for consistency in our analysis through the paper, we use the share of manufacturing production in total output as our preferred measure of industrialization. correlation between trade policy space and the share of value added in manufacturing production in total output is not clear-cut.
To investigate the impact of trade policy space on manufacturing production, we draw on model (4) and postulate the following model:
where i represents a country's index; t denotes the time-period. We use the same panel dataset as for model (4). The dependent variable "VAMAN" stands for the share of manufacturing value added in total output. β 0 to β 11 are parameters to be estimated. # i are countries' fixed effects; u t captures the time effects, which represent the global shocks that could affect all countries' manufacturing production path together. " it is a well-behaving error term. Appendix A describes the variables used in model (5); the list of countries used in the estimation of this model is displayed in Appendix B. Appendix E displays the descriptive statistics on the variables of model (4). Like for model (4), we estimate model (5) using the SGMM approach, where the variables of interest TPSPACE and a number of control variables, including financial development, education level, and financial openness have been considered as endogenous. Here also, the endogeneity does not only stem from the reverse causality from the dependent variable to TPSPACE and its square term, but also from the eventual measurement error associated with the calculation of TPSPACE. The variable "INST" is considered as exogenous for the reasons mentioned above. In using the SGMM estimator, we first perform the analysis over the full sample. The results of the estimations of model (2) over the full sample are reported in Table 5 . Second, we Table 5 . Impact of trade policy space on value added in manufacturing production (% total output) over the entire sample (Estimator: Two-step system GMM). examine the net effect of trade policy space on manufacturing production share in subsamples LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs (see the list of countries in these sub-samples in Appendix D) by proceeding in the same way as for the analysis of the effect of trade policy space on production diversification (see the previous section). The results of the Notes: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. In the two-step system GMM estimations, the variables "TPSPACE", "FINDEV", "EDU", and "FINPOL" have been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. Two-period lags of the dependent variables have been included in the regressions in order to meet the requirements of the diagnostic tests associated with the two-step system GMM estimator. In fact, with only one-period lag of the dependent variable, the coefficient of one-period lag of the dependent variable is almost one, which makes the system of equations explosive.
estimations of different variants of model (5) that would help obtain the net effect of trade policy space on manufacturing production share in the sub-samples LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs are displayed in Table 6 . Results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that there is a state dependence path in the share of manufacturing production. It is worth noting that we have used two-period lags in these regressions because with only one-period lag, the requirements of the diagnostic tests associated with the SGMM estimator are not fulfilled. In fact, in the event we use only the one-period lag of the dependent variable as a regressor, the coefficient of this variable approaches 1 (and is eventually higher than 1 in some regressions), which makes the system of equations explosive. In Tables 5 and 6 , the one-period lag of the manufacturing production share is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the two-period lag of this share is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. These clearly suggest that there is a state dependence path in manufacturing production share. The outcomes of the diagnostics tests that help evaluate the appropriateness of the SGMM estimator to estimate model (5) (and its variants that help examine the net effect of trade policy space across sub-samples) are reported at the bottom of Tables 5 and 6. All these outcomes confirm that the SGMM estimator is appropriate for the estimations of model (5) and its different variants. Turning now to the estimates displayed in Table 5 , we obtain that over the full sample, trade policy space exerts a positive and significant impact on manufacturing production share. This is because the coefficient of the TPSPACE variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Specifically, a 1-point increase in the Notes: *p-value < 0:1; **p-value < 0:05; ***p-value < 0:01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis.
In the two-step system GMM estimations, the variables "TPSPACE", "FINDEV", "EDU", and "FIN-POL" have been considered as endogenous. The other variables have been considered as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. Two-period lags of the dependent variables have been included in the regressions in order to meet the requirements of the diagnostic tests associated with the two-step system GMM estimator. In fact, with only one-period lag of the dependent variable, the coefficient of one-period lag of the dependent variable is almost one, which makes the system of equations explosive.
TPSPACE indicator induces 7.07 percentage points increase in the manufacturing production share. Concerning control variables, we observe that greater multilateral trade liberalization, higher education level, and higher share of arable land in total land are positively and significantly associated with manufacturing production share. However, higher financial development induces lower manufacturing production share, which may be explained by a possible Dutch disease effect of financial development on manufacturing production share (a higher depth of financial development could induce higher inflation, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, which would lead to lower manufacturing production share). The development level is nonlinearly related to manufacturing production share, as it is associated with higher manufacturing production only above a certain threshold of real per capita income. Financial openness, the population size and the institutional quality do not significantly influence the manufacturing production share. Taking up estimates in Table 6 , we obtain that results of control variables are to a large extent, consistent with those in Table 5 , except for the real per capita income and its square term, which do not appear to be significantly related to manufacturing production share. Concerning the variable of interest, we obtain that at the 5% level of statistical significance, the net effect of trade policy space on manufacturing production in LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs is given, respectively, by 2.171 [ ¼ À9:769þ 11:94]; 4.438; 14.3 [ ¼ 5:946 þ 8:376]; and 12.54 [ ¼ 8:008 þ 4:528]. These suggest that for all sub-samples, there is a positive and statistically significant effect (at the 5% level) of trade policy space on manufacturing production share, i.e., on industrialization. The group of LICs appears to enjoy the lowest impact of trade policy space on manufacturing production (probably due to their inability to fully derive advantage of their trade policy space to promote of industrialization). This group is followed (in ascending order) by LMICs, HICs and UMICs (which appears to enjoy the highest positive effect of trade policy space on industrialization).
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a quantitative measure of trade policy space, and examined its impact on production diversification (across goods sectors, as well as across goods and services sectors). It complements this analysis by additionally investigating how trade policy space affects industrialization, notably the share of manufacturing production in total output. The results indicate that over the full sample, as well as for sub-samples LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs, trade policy space is conducive to greater production diversification across the goods sectors (the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors). The group of HICs appears to experience the highest positive effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods sector. This group is followed by LICs, UMICs, and LMICs, as far as the magnitude of the impact is concerned. The analysis also shows that for the full sample as well as the sub-samples of LICs, UMICs, and HICs, trade policy space exerts a positive and significant effect on production diversification across the goods and services sectors, that is, the agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services sectors. Here, HICs appear once again to be the group that enjoys the highest positive effect of trade policy space on production diversification across the goods and services sectors. This group is followed by UMICs and then LICs. For LMICs, trade policy space tends to be associated with production concentration in some goods and/or services sector, although the magnitude of the impact is very small. Finally, and interestingly, the analysis suggests that trade policy space promotes industrialization, as it is associated with higher share of manufacturing production in total output. This result applies to the full sample as well as to subsamples, including LICs, LMICs, UMICs and HICs, although the lowest positive effect appears to be for LICs. From the policy perspective, the analysis also suggests that lower non-trade obligations (constraints) on trade policy would contribute to facilitating industrialization, as well as production diversification.
This analysis does not claim that the proposed indicator of trade policy space is a perfect one. As a result, one avenue for future research could be to fine-tune the measure of trade policy space, as other studies could define trade policy space in different ways (there is indeed no universal definition of trade policy space). Additionally, our measures of production diversification are likely imperfect as they do not rely on a disaggregated data in each of the sectors considered in the analysis, but instead rely on aggregate sectoral shares. However, the analysis of the effect of trade policy space on our aggregate measures of production diversification has the advantage of providing an insight into the extent to which trade policy space could be related to production diversification. Furthermore, this limitation of the empirical analysis has, to a large extent, been overcome by the analysis of the effect of trade policy space on industrialization.
Variable Definition Source PRODDIV1 Index of production diversification across the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors.
Author's calculation, see Sec. 3.1 PRODDIV2 Index of production diversification across the agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services sectors.
Author's calculation, see Sec. 3.1 VAMAN Ratio (%) of value added on manufacturing production to total output United Nations database TPSPACE This is the index of trade policy space.
Author's calculation (see Sec. 2 of the text).
DTP This is the domestic trade policy indicator. It is a component of the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. It is composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. Its computation is based on two components: tradeweighted average tariff range and non-tariff barriers (NTBs), the extent of latter having been determined on the basis of quantitative and qualitative available information. NTBs include quantity restrictions, price restrictions, regulatory restrictions, investment restrictions, customs restrictions, and direct government interventions. This score is graded on a scale of 0-100, with a rise indicating lower trade barriers, i.e., higher trade liberalization, while a decrease reflects rising trade protectionism.
Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/issues/economicfreedom see Miller et al.
MTP Average Trade Policy of the Rest of the World. For a given country, this variable has been calculated as the average trade freedom score of the rest of the world (for countries for which data exist).
Author's calculation based on Heritage Foundation data. This index has been computed by Chinn and Ito (2006) and updated in July 2017. Its value ranges between 0 and 1. We have multiplied by 100 so as to ensure a coherence with the trade policy variable defined below (which is also a measure of a de jure trade policy, whose value range between 0 and 100) See "PolStab" is the measure of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. "RegQual" stands for Regulatory Quality index.
GDPC
"Rulelaw"
represents the Rule of Law index. "GovEff" is the Government Effectiveness index. "VoiceAcc" is the index of Voice and Accountability;
"Cor" is the index of corruption. It is worth noting that higher values of the index "INST" are associated with better governance and institutional quality, while lower values reflect worse governance and institutional quality. 
